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NOSTALGIA FOR THE SOVIET PAST IN THE MASS HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF MODERN RUSSIANS

Abstract: In modern Russia, there is a clear discrepancy between the official policy of historical memory and the mass historical consciousness. In the politics of official memory, Joseph Stalin is a tyrant, a dictator who killed millions of people. In the mass historical consciousness, he is a fighter against corruption and privileges, a caring owner of a huge country. While the mass historical consciousness considers the Victory in the Great Patriotic War as a significant event of the twentieth century, the policy of historical memory turns to the tragic sides of this war. Other examples can be given. At the divergence of the official policy of historical memory and mass historical consciousness, there are “wars of monuments” and “wars of memory”, as well as various manipulative strategies on the part of the authorities. So far, the official policy of historical memory fluctuates between these two formulas. The main reason for the discrepancy between the official policy of historical memory and the mass historical consciousness in modern Russia is that in Russian society, due to economic and political problems, nostalgia for the Soviet past, deemed a time of stability and certainty is growing.

Keywords: *policy of historical memory; mass historical consciousness; Stalin; Civil war in Russia; Perestroika; post-Soviet Russia.*

The policy of historical memory and mass historical consciousness in post-Soviet Russia has become the subject of research by representatives of various scientific disciplines, but it is mainly studied by philosophers, political scientists and sociologists. Foreign researchers are also showing interest in this topic (Corney, F.C. 2004; Carleton, G. 2016; Brunstedt, J. 2011. Al'tman, I. 2005).

Mass historical consciousness in modern Russia is formed under the influence of several factors, the main of which should be considered three: 1) the

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official policy of historical memory of the liberal anti-Soviet direction; 2) the growing activity of the Russian Orthodox Church as an agent (actor) of the policy of historical memory; 3) the growing nostalgia in Russian society for the Soviet past, which acquired mythological features – a period of stability, low prices, free social benefits, etc. This article analyses the role of nostalgia for the Soviet past in the formation of the mass historical consciousness of modern Russians.

The reformatting of the memory of the Soviet past in modern Russia began during the years of Perestroika. The fundamental myth underlying the policy of historical memory has changed: “the prosperous Soviet people” has become “the suffering Soviet people”. The source of the suffering of the Soviet people was declared Stalin’s tyrannical regime and Joseph Stalin himself. It was believed that Joseph Stalin distorted the “pure origins of Leninism”. The prevailing belief in society was that it was enough to return to these “pure sources of Leninism” for the renewal of socialism. In the 1990s, another transformation of the myth took place. Now the Soviet government and the Communist Party were declared the culprit of the suffering of the Soviet people. The concept of totalitarianism was borrowed as an explanatory construction. Although the book by Hannah Arendt, in which totalitarian regimes were analyzed, was published in 1951, it became known to the Russian readers only in the early 1990s. Many researchers, finding themselves in a methodological vacuum after abandoning the mandatory theory of “Marxism-Leninism”, perceived the theory of totalitarianism as a kind of revelation, and, accordingly, could not critically approach this concept. In scientific studies analyzing Hitler’s Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union, although they see a certain similarity between these regimes, they also note a clear contrast between the two regimes. In Russia in the 1990s, they preferred not to notice the difference between the regimes, identifying Communism and Nazism in essence. The concept of totalitarianism was extended to the entire Soviet period, which fully met the needs of the official policy of historical memory, which sought to present the Soviet period of Russia’s history as an absolute evil and a denial of such principles as democracy and humanism. Having rejected then this concept as an explanatory scheme for various reasons, the official and liberal policy of historical memory in modern Russia, however, has retained its anti-Soviet orientation.

The Russian Orthodox Church was severely restricted in the atheistic Soviet Union and did not participate in any way in the formation of the policy of historical memory. The liberation of the Orthodox Church from numerous

restrictions during the years of Perestroika led to the fact that it became not only an influential public organization, but also began to claim a leading role in ideology. Currently, the Orthodox Church also claims to be an expert in the memorialization of certain historical figures.

Nostalgia for the idealized and mythologized Soviet past is an inevitable consequence of the economic, political and social problems that exist in modern Russia. It should be noted that the massive attack on Soviet symbols in the 1990s could not destroy the mass ideas about the country of the Soviets.

Let us analyse now how these three factors manifested themselves in the mass consciousness in post-Soviet Russia.

The Civil war in Russia in 1918–1920 immediately after its end began to acquire a mythological dimension. The glorification of the struggle of the Reds against the White Guards, foreign interventionists and their “henchmen” (in the person of the Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Anarchists) has acquired epic proportions. In the face of the Reds, the Soviet policy of historical memory represented universal good, and in the face of their opponents – universal evil. The symbolic potential of the heroic struggle against the White Guards was used in Soviet propaganda in the pre-war years and during the Great Patriotic war. After the Great Patriotic war, it was replaced by the heroic pages of this war, but to some extent it remained in the mass consciousness. At the same time, there was a certain division of the mythological spheres of struggle: the heroes of the Great Patriotic war fought for their Homeland, the heroes of the Civil war fought for the ideals of justice, which were set by the victory of the October Revolution. In this form, these two wars remained in the mass consciousness until the beginning of Perestroika. During the years of Perestroika, the reformatting of the memory of the Civil war began. This was facilitated by a number of internal Russian factors – memoirs of participants of the white movement who put forward their “truth” in the struggle for “Russia” were published en masse, there was an opportunity to freely discuss many previously closed topics, historians got access to archival documents of the white movement, Western studies of the history of the Civil war in Russia were translated and published, and, finally, social forces appeared that began to claim the role of heirs of the ideals of the white movement – “united and indivisible Russia” and “Orthodox Russians”.

The Orthodox Church (the attitude of the Bolsheviks to which was negative, and the white movement, on the contrary, allegedly fought for “holy Russia”), as its influence increased, began to idealize the White Guards and

demonize the Bolsheviks. In addition, the reformatting of the fundamental myth underlying the policy of historical memory in the Soviet period (as described above) eventually led to the fact that the Civil war was considered not as a heroic, but as a tragic page of Russian history, in which there were no winners, but the ordinary Russian people tragically suffered in a bloody fratricidal massacre. It should be noted that the perception of this dimension of the Civil war was facilitated by the fact that this aspect was preserved in the mass consciousness during the Soviet period for a long time. A striking example is the cult Soviet feature film “Chapaev”, (based on the novel of the same name by Dmitry Furmanov) shot by George and Sergey Vasiliev and released in 1934. Although this film was subsequently repeatedly criticized for its pronounced propaganda character, but the audience liked it for an interesting dynamic plot, excellent acting, and many replicas (although it is difficult to say in accordance with the plan of the script authors and directors, or contrary to them) like “Whites will come – rob, Reds will come – rob. Where could a poor peasant go?”, the deep layers of ideas about the Civil war in the mass consciousness of the Soviet era were so powerfully revealed that they essentially became the concepts that opposed the official interpretation of this event.

But despite the fact that the Civil war began to be perceived as a tragedy, the ideals of justice were invariably associated by the mass consciousness not with the White Guards, but with those who defeated them – the Red Army and the Bolsheviks. The social inequality and economic problems that are growing in modern Russia have once again made popular the heroes of the Civil war who fought against the White Guards. And, accordingly, the existing regime in Russia in the mass consciousness is steadily associated with the White Guards. The most striking manifestation of this confrontation is the struggle against perpetuating the memory of those who fought against the Reds during the Civil war. In 1997, the president of Russia signed a decree “On the construction of a monument to Russians who died during the Civil war” in order to approve the ideas of reconciliation and harmony in society. However, in everyday life, the confrontation is intensifying. Public memory becomes the object of political struggle and manipulation. In Irkutsk, on the pedestal of the monument to Admiral Aleksander Kolchak, a White Guard and a Red Army soldier symbolically lower rifles directed against each other with fixed bayonets. In the capital of white Siberia – Omsk – the public is fighting against the installation of a monument to Admiral Kolchak. The authorities only managed to open a

memorial plaque on the wall of the Cadet Corps dedicated to the admiral as a polar explorer. Although the name of Kolchak is actively used for commercial purposes – the Kolchak restaurant is open in Omsk and Kolchak vodka is produced. In 1999, in 23 localities of Russia, they tried to install monuments to Czech legionnaires on the basis of an agreement between the governments of the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic. This immediately split the society. Most Russians see this as a blasphemous attitude towards those who died during the Civil war, and are categorically against it. Another part of Russians allows monuments to Czechoslovaks, but only in cemeteries. The struggle against the monument to Kolchak continues. And, moreover, it is gradually developing into a confrontation with any attempts to reconcile “Whites” and “Reds” in the public space. Having despaired of attempts to erect a monument to Kolchak in Omsk, local public forces propose to erect a monument to the victims of the Civil war. But even in this format, this monument causes active resistance.

Another figure of the confrontation associated with the growing nostalgia for the idealized Soviet past was Stalin, whom the policy of historical memory still tries to present as the main culprit of all the troubles of Russians during his rule (violent collectivization, bloody repressions, miscalculations and defeats during the Great Patriotic war, etc.). Several years ago, an attempt was made to erect a monument to Stalin in Novosibirsk. Supporters of the installation of the monument in this large Russian and the largest Siberian city wanted the bust to be installed in a prominent place. They offered to install it either in the Square of the Heroes of the Revolution or on the territory of the Monument of Glory. However, the art council at the city hall rejected this application. The Square of Heroes of the Revolution and the Monument of Glory in Novosibirsk are monuments of federal significance and their integrity cannot be violated. The art council recommended installing a monument to Stalin next to the monuments of marshal Georgy Zhukov, Konstantin Rokossovsky and Viktor Talalikhin in the memorial and historical park on the territory of the Alexander Pokryshkin Technical college. But the director of the college said that Stalin would interfere with the educational process. They tried to install Stalin near the House of Officers, but the Russian military historical society, headed by the minister of culture Vladimir Medinsky, put a bust of Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov on this place. Activists tried to appeal to the mayor of Novosibirsk. Although the mayor Anatoly Lokot belongs to the Communist Party, but he took an evasive position – he offered to conduct a survey of the opinion of citizens.

The symbolic meaning of the monument to Stalin is also interesting in this context. Opponents of his installation refer to the repression and genocide against a number of peoples of the USSR, violation of the rule of law and the lack of democratic freedoms. So, in the Crimea, a memorial plaque dedicated to Stalin's stay at the Yalta conference was doused with red paint, and the word "executioner" was written on the wall next to it. Supporters of the monument can be divided into two groups. The first – a very small one – is the Stalinists, who are engaged in the apologetics of Stalin in journalism. The second – quite numerous – transfers to Stalin those features that clearly contrast with modern Russia. They argue their position by the fact that under Stalin the country developed as an industrial power, there was no corruption, there was free medicine and education, leaders of all levels were responsible for their decisions. But, thus, the Stalin to whom they want to erect a monument only superficially resembles the head of the Soviet state in 1924–1953. The content of this symbol is very different from the real historical prototype.

Let's note one more feature. The mythological image of Stalin is formed despite the fact that he was written about him and is written in textbooks that are intended to form the historical consciousness of the younger generation. Nevertheless, the textbooks give an interesting picture of the evolution of the image of Stalin, reflecting again not the historical epoch in the life of the Soviet country, but the changing realities of post-Soviet Russia.

So the authors of the textbook published in 1996 (Dmitrenko, V.P. 1996), purposefully form the reader's idea that the victories of the Soviet people in the war are not at all connected with Stalin, but with generals, heroism, patriotism, etc., and repressions and defeats are associated with Stalin. The mythological Stalin of the early 1990s is a kind of anti-Gorbachev and at the same time anti-Yeltsin in the mass consciousness of Russians of that time. And it is with this "anti-Gorbachev" and "anti-Yeltsin" that the authors of the textbook are conducting their irreconcilable struggle.

Ten years have passed. Much has changed in the Russian reality. The economic transformations of a catastrophic nature were replaced by sluggish stagnation and illusory "stability"; the political system acquired some stable outlines; "constitutional order" was restored in Chechnya; the indiscriminate groaning of the Soviet past was replaced by patriotic rhetoric. Accordingly, in the educational literature, the emphasis in the coverage of Stalin also began to shift. So, in the school history textbook published in 2006 [Danilov, A.A. 2006], in the

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author's presentation, Stalin was and remains "bad". However, the authors unobtrusively hint that there were "a lot of good things", which would be nice to use in modern Russia. And Stalin, if we separate his hypostases of a tyrant and a manager, and discard the first, is not so bad at all.

So, the mythological Stalin in modern Russia is a vivid example of the growing nostalgia for Soviet times.

The third field of confrontation between the official policy of historical memory and nostalgia for the Soviet in the mass historical consciousness are the plots related to the Great Patriotic war. According to sociological surveys conducted in Russia in different years, the Victory in the Great Patriotic war remains the most important among the significant events of the twentieth century. This, for example, is evidenced by the data of the Center for Socio-Political Monitoring of the RANEPА [Pokida, A. 2015]. However, Victory occupies an insignificant place in the policy of historical memory. Over the past 30 years, several hundred films and TV series dedicated to the Great Patriotic war have been shot, and there is not a single film dedicated to the Victory among them. Even the film "Victory Day", released in 2006, was dedicated to how the "penal battalion" fought. This is not surprising. The victory in the Great Patriotic war does not fit into the fundamental myth that underlies the policy of historical memory in post-Soviet Russia.

It should be noted that the erasure of historical memory began immediately after the end of the Great Patriotic war. The policy of historical memory of the first post-war years was aimed at ousting from the mass consciousness the tragic and ambiguous aspects of the past war, especially its initial period, and replacing them with epic-heroic pages (Dobrenko 59). This is clearly seen when comparing films from the war period and the first post-war years. Thus, the former focused on the mobilization of all the resources of the country (both material and "spiritual") for the fight against the fascist invaders, while the latter were devoted exclusively to victory as a symbol of the triumph of the Soviet system, the Stalinist leadership and the advantages of socialism.

This perspective of the coverage of the events of the past war in the politics of historical memory was preserved until the period of Perestroika. So, the initial period of the war with bitter defeats was practically not shown, and if it was shown, it was only in the perspective of "the treacherous attack of fascist Germany on the peacefully sleeping country of the Soviets". But more and more attention was paid to the victorious battles – the battle of Moscow, Stalingrad,

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Kursk and the triumphant offensive on Berlin. And those battles in which the Red Army either did not achieve significant success or was defeated (for example, the Battle of Rzhev), were deliberately displaced from historical memory and, accordingly, from the mass consciousness. The erasure of memory continued after the XX Congress and during the reign of Leonid Brezhnev. Memoirs were rewritten, some heroes were exalted to the detriment of others. The place of Stalin as the leader of the country during the Great Patriotic war in the policy of historical memory was firmly occupied by the Communist Party (For more information, see: Kokoulin 10–25).

Russian Orthodox Church actively forms the idea that during the Great Patriotic war, the decisive role in the victory over fascism was played by the religious feelings of the Russian people, which were revived during the years of the most difficult trials.

At present, it is still difficult to determine to what extent the idea of the special role of the church in the history of the Great Patriotic war is taking root in the mass consciousness. However, the strengthening of the influence of religious ideology is undoubtedly. This is confirmed by the fact that even in history textbooks written by historians who are very far from religious topics when covering other subjects of Soviet history, this topic is present in the theme of the Great Patriotic war.

The political regime of modern Russia has not yet developed its “foundation myth”: the main efforts of the authorities so far have been aimed at overcoming the Stalinist, and then the Soviet legacy in the politics of historical memory. However, the mass consciousness is still resisting the state policy of historical memory. A typical example. In 2020, under the restrictions of mass events in Novosibirsk, a demonstration was held on the central square on May 9 on Victory Day. Attempts by the police to convince the protesters to go home because of the danger of coronavirus infection were not successful. The protesters argued their refusal by saying that the “brown plague” (fascism) was defeated, and the coronavirus will be defeated. It should be noted that the president of Russia connects the victory over the coronavirus not with the victory in the Great Patriotic war, but appeals to more ancient times, with the victory over the Polovtsians and Pechenegs in the X–XII centuries. This reflects the obvious influence of the church’s policy of historical memory, namely that the origins of modern Russian statehood should be sought not in the recent past, but in “Russian History” in its “Orthodox version” as a whole.

While the Stalinist regime after the Great Patriotic war legitimized itself by appealing to Victory, the modern political regime in Russia has not yet developed its own ideology. However, the main outlines of this ideology are already being outlined, however, in an alternative version – “Orthodox Russia” (which the Orthodox Church insists on) and the imperial formula “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality” (as can be judged by the public speeches of Russian president Vladimir Putin). Currently, the Russian regime is in a state of uncertainty. It is not yet possible to say how long this uncertainty will last.

Having failed in attempts to replace Soviet symbols and monuments with opponents of the Bolsheviks during the Civil war, the official policy of historical memory makes active attempts to replace the “Soviet” with symbols and myths of Russia’s distant historical past. So, in recent years, a new campaign has been launched in Russia to rename squares and streets named after Soviet leaders. And also the replacement of monuments to Soviet leaders with monuments to figures of Ancient Russia.

In early March 2021, the vice-speaker of the Legislative Assembly of the Novosibirsk Region, Andrey Panferov, proposed to rename Sverdlov Square in the center of Novosibirsk in honor of Prince Alexander Nevsky, and the public transport stop on this square (called “Sverdlov Square”) in honor of the Alexander Nevsky Temple located near the square. Andrey Panferov explained: “The name ‘Alexander Nevsky Temple’ has been historically present on the territory of modern Novosibirsk for 126 years. From the very first days, the temple became the spiritual dominant and the starting point of cultural and historical development. The name of St. Alexander Nevsky and the name of the first stone temple of the city of Novosibirsk are intertwined in the minds of residents”. He then sent an appeal to Metropolitan of Novosibirsk and Berdsk Nikodim.

In this case, the deputy speaker of the Legislative Assembly resorted to a certain manipulation – “historical organizations, the cultural community and residents of the city” did not speak out on this topic before this appeal. But in the comments to the publication of this material on the website “Taiga.info” the citizens were divided into two polar groups. Let us quote the most striking statements of representatives of both groups. “I’m against it! It’s enough for us to promote religion”, “I agree, I’m also against renaming, only this deputy, who takes on a lot, and that Nicodim of the church, will squeeze out the money for himself”, “It’s time for a long time. Yasha Sverdlov is in fact the first racketeer of

the Urals, an executioner and a bandit. Renaming has long been necessary, but “economically”, “[t]here was a worthy proposal earlier to rename the square in honour of the architect of our city and the creator of this square, Andrey Kryachkov. His name should be immortalized. And Alexander Nevsky will have eternal glory even without Novosibirsk Square!”, “Why am I not surprised that it was ‘United Russia’ that proposed such a ‘spirit-loving’ idea”.

The mayor of Novosibirsk, communist Anatoly Lokot, immediately opposed this idea. Arguments in favour of renaming, which, in the opinion of Andrey Panferov, could convince a significant part of the citizens who share communist ideas, he expressed in public comments to the statement of Anatoly Lokot. He recalled that it was Stalin (whose figure is highly respected among the Novosibirsk Communists) who turned to the figure of Alexander Nevsky during the Great Patriotic war and the famous film by Sergei Eisenstein about Alexander Nevsky was shot.

Alexander Nevsky has several dimensions in the historical memory of Russia – an outstanding commander, statesman and saint. Recently, he began to acquire the features of the “first Eurasian”, who was friends with the East and opposed the West. Of these dimensions, the vice-speaker of the Novosibirsk Legislative Assembly appeals to only two – a warrior and a statesman.

Well-known public and political figures of Novosibirsk joined the public discussion of the problem. In their speeches, they compared the situation in Novosibirsk with the recent attempt to install a monument to Alexander Nevsky on Lubyanskaya Square instead of the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky. Thus, the Novosibirsk architect Igor Popovsky admitted that this situation resembles what happened with Lubyanskaya Square in Moscow: “The situation was brought to the point that the citizens were divided into two camps, and then they decided to simply curtail the discussion: they say, they were joking – and that’s enough”. The architectural historian Oleg Viktorovich supported this idea: “It seems that it is necessary to stop at the Solomonic solution, as with Dzerzhinsky in Moscow. Sobyenin spoke and said that there would be no renaming. It is absolutely pointless to discuss this”.

One small but very significant detail remained outside of these statements – a vote was held on the installation of the monument on Lubyanskaya Square in Moscow, with a very characteristic result: 52 % – for Nevsky and 48 % – for Dzerzhinsky. An uncertain commentator on the social network Facebook wrote the following: “It seemed that there could be no questions: who is Alexander

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Nevsky, the saviour of the Fatherland, and what is iron Felix with his cannibalism? <...> This is explained simply: all liberal Russophobes <...> voted not for Felix, but against Nevsky, except for the communists, stood on the side of the emergency. We are ready to see a bloody executioner on a pedestal in the centre of Moscow, if only not a Russian prince". But it seems that such an explanation, although it characterizes a certain part of the supporters of Alexander Nevsky of the monarchical sense, does not explain the situation in any way.

Thus, this "war of monuments" is not local in nature, but is characteristic of Russian society as a whole. We can also add the situation that has developed in St. Petersburg, related to the transfer of several buildings to the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, including the Annunciation Cathedral, where Alexander Suvorov is buried, and where the tombstones of many outstanding figures of Russian history were transferred. These tombstones, as well as other museum exhibits, were proposed to be moved from the building of the Annunciation Cathedral to another place, which was actively opposed by the staff of the museums of St. Petersburg. As we can see, in this case, the main factor that has manifested itself in this confrontation is nostalgia for the Soviet past.

Conclusion

The formation of mass historical consciousness in modern Russia is contradictory. However, the unfolding "wars of memory" and "wars of monuments" clearly indicate that the main factor determining the nature of these memorial wars is the growing nostalgia for the idealized and mythologized Soviet past. Moreover, this Soviet past in the mass consciousness acquires the features of an antipode to the existing economic, political and social order in modern Russia.

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